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J I M P H I L L I P S
Oceanspan: Deindustrialisation and
Devolution in Scotland, c. 1960-1974
ABSTRACT
Oceanspan was a grand design for Scotland’s economic, industrial and
social regeneration. It attempted to position Scotland as a land bridge
between the Atlantic Ocean and Continental Europe: raw materials would
flow in from the west, utilising the deep water of the Firth of Clyde, and be
converted into finished goods for export across the North Sea.
The chief architect of the plan was William Lithgow, the Port Glasgow
shipbuilder, and it was publicised by the Scottish Council for Develop-
ment and Industry, an organisation that encompassed representatives of
local authorities and trade unions but was dominated by business inter-
ests. The plans were geared to assisting new industries notably electronics,
but implied special privileges for the older heavy industries with which
Lithgow and Lord Clydesmuir, chairman of the Scottish Council, were
associated. Substantial public investment was required, which was resisted
by both Labour and Conservative governments. Only the political sympa-
thies of the Scottishcouncil leaders, nurtured further by the various social
and industrial difficulties facing the Conservative government in 1971
and 1972, notably the miners’ strike and the work-in at Upper Clyde Ship-
builders, averted a substantial public row. Oceanspan nevertheless repre-
sents an important episode in the longer history of the emergence of
devolutionary or nationalist impulses in modern Scotland, for the plkans
linked Scotland’s apparent economic and industrial stagnation with the
alleged problem of remote administrationof policy in Scotland from
Whitehall, and incorporated demands for enhanced policy powers for the
Scottish Office.
In 1969 the Scottish Council for Development and Industry, a planning
body dominated by business leaders although also comprising local
authority representatives and trade union officials,1 published details of
a scheme, entitled Oceanspan, to promote the long-term regeneration of
central Scotland’s industrial belt. This was to involve substantial capital
investment in cargo transport links, particularly in the Clyde and Forth
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ports, to facilitate the rapid west to east processing of raw materials from
the oceanic trades, landed on the Clyde, to finished goods, manufac-
tured in central Scotland, and exported from the Forth, mainly to conti-
nental Europe. The Scottish Council emphasised that this entailed a
central change in the country’s economic orientation. The established
north to south axes that connected greater Glasgow and greater Edin-
burgh separately with England should give way to a new west to east axis,
integrating the economies of western and eastern central Scotland, and
positioning this Scottish economy as an off-shore conduit for trade with
Europe, which was to provide Scotland with a much larger ‘home
market’ than was accessible in the UK alone. Such a configuration would
necessitate an important change in the administration of port transport
policy, with the establishment of an integrated Scottish Ports Authority.
This would be ’autonomous’, free to develop outwith the constraints of
the UK Labour government’s planned nationalisation of port transport,
and operating under the direction of the Scottish Office rather than the
Ministry of Transport.2
The chief architect of the scheme was William Lithgow, head of the
Clyde shipbuilding dynasty, and immersed at this point in a range of
crises – mergers, takeovers, government rescues and serial minor labour
disputes – that were located essentially in industrial decline.3 He was also
a trenchant business critic of Harold Wilson’s Labour government,
arguing that ‘socialist’ economic and social policies had ‘destroyed’ vital
and once characteristic elements of public life in Scotland, including
capital formation from low incomes and corresponding ‘self-respect,
self-discipline and the vital spark of self-determination’.4 Oceanspan –
inspired by Lithgow’s ideological foundations as well as his industrial
concerns – duly brings into focus two linked historical processes that
characterised Scotland’s development towards the end of the twentieth
century, devolution and deindustrialisation. ‘Devolution’ is, of course,
very strongly associated with the 1979 referendum and the politics of the
1980s and 1990s, which were characterised by debates about the legiti-
macy of Conservative governance in Scotland.5 ‘The key reason’, writes
Lindsay Paterson, explaining the emergence in the 1980s of more
broad-ranging electoral support for political devolution than had been
evident in 1979, and which was the basis of the establishment of the
Scottish Parliament in 1999, ‘was Margaret Thatcher’.6 Of particular
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importance here was the adoption by her governments of economic pol-
icies that contributed to extremely rapid economic restructuring. The
impact of what Christopher Harvie called ‘instant post-industrialisation’
was more severe in Scotland as a whole than in England as a whole; more
robust financial and service sectors in the South of England thrived, to
an extent, on Thatcher’s policies.7 Anti-inflationary fiscal mechanisms,
designed by Thatcher’s Chancellors to dampen roaring growth in the
south, were experienced as crudely deflationary instruments in indus-
trial Scotland, further speeding the contraction of primary production.
Hence political devolution in Scotland came to be viewed as mitigating
economic decline by providing the means of matching economic and
industrial management to Scotland’s particular needs.8
This article examines an important earlier episode in debates about
the linkage between industrial stagnation and the institutions of pol-
icy-making, although the politics of Oceanspan in the late 1960s and early
1970s were roughly the inverse of the position in the 1980s and 1990s
when various anti-Conservative opposition strands saw Home Rule as an
escape from Thatcherism. Lithgow and other Scottish business leaders,
many of whom were Tory supporters, members and office bearers, saw
greater devolution of economic, industrial and transport policy as the
means of evading the socialism of Harold Wilson’s UK government. This
points to a central but arguably unexplored aspect of the recent politi-
cal, economic and social history of Scotland. In the 1960s and in the first
half of the 1970s there was an observable ‘anti -socialist’ – or anti-Labour
government – dimension to the growth of support for devolution in
Scotland. Initially, through Oceanspan, the Scottish Council focused on
the possible enhancement of Scottish economic and administrative –
although not, at this stage, political – autonomy, with ports policy to be
shaped by the Scottish Office in conjunction with Scottish port authori-
ties, port employers and users. This would secure a powerful role for
private enterprise and cut across the Labour government’s planned
nationalisation of the ports, with policy directed from the Ministry of
Transport in Whitehall. Here the Scottish Council drew on support from
the Conservative Party in Parliament, with Tory MPs – led by Teddy
Taylor – drafting amendments to the government’s nationalisation bill
‘to seek separate and autonomous port authorities for Scotland and
England’.9 Hence Oceanspan marks a significant episode in the trend
towards greater autonomy in Scotland, with industrialists leading
demands for devolution on administrative and economic matters.
In this, of course, Lithgow and the Scottish Council reflected wider
historical forces, with devolutionist pressure on the 1964-70 Labour gov-
ernment coming not just from the Scottish National Party after the 1967
Hamilton by-election, but also from the Conservative opposition, partic-
ularly after the party leader, Edward Heath, delivered his 1968
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‘Declaration of Perth’, offering the possibility of constitutional change
under a future Conservative government.10 Wilson duly initiated several
devolutionary measures, including a Royal Commission into the future
governance of Scotland, to which the Scottish Council gave evidence in
November 1969.11 After the election of Heath’s Conservative govern-
ment in 1970 the Scottish Council, steered by Lord Clydesmuir, of the
Colvilles steel dynasty, initially maintained pressure for greater adminis-
trative devolution. Although Heath stalled on Home Rule, awaiting the
report of Wilson’s Royal Commission, the apparatus of policy-making in
Scotland was overhauled. Here earlier impetus had come from the
report of the inquiry appointed by the Scottish Council into the Scottish
economy, chaired by John Toothill, Managing Director of Ferranti, and
published in November 1961. Toothill recommended a new economic
affairs department within the Scottish Office, to co-ordinate industrial
and planning development and so facilitate faster economic growth.12
In 1964 the Scottish Office duly established the Economic Planning
Board to co-ordinate the ‘Scottish’ work of the various Whitehall
ministries involved in economic and industrial questions. This was
replaced by Heath’s government with a new Scottish Economic Policy
Department, responsible for industrial and regional policy, and but-
tressed by an additional Scottish Office Minister of State for North Sea
Oil development.13
These were significant initiatives, but short of the Scottish Council’s
demands for Scottish oversight of Scottish ports and no government
commitment to their redevelopment was forthcoming. Yet from May
1972 until the fall of Heath’s government in February 1974 the Scottish
Council discontinued its devolutionist and ports campaigns. But, in lieu
of unambiguous evidence, and while respecting Alec Cairncross’
warning about the danger of translating ‘high correlative coefficients’
into causal relationships,14 it should be noted that the Council’s turn
away from devolution coincided with a significant upsurge in industrial
protest. This was accompanied, arguably, by sharpening social tension,
with a collision of class and industrial conflict evident in the ‘work in’ at
Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS) from July 1971 to February 1972 and
the national strike by UK coal miners early in 1972.15 These conflicts
developed from Heath’s initial emphasis on economic restructuring,
withdrawing support for ‘lame duck’ companies and industries. A
change of approach was adopted, however, in March 1972, with an
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expansionist budget and Industry Act – reintroducing significant public
subsidy of manufacturing industry – designed to alleviate industrial and
social tension.16 These measures quite possibly persuaded the Scottish
Council that economic and social stabilisation could be achieved within
existing administrative and political frameworks, short of additional
devolutionary developments.
This article duly situates the dispersal of Scottish business enthusiasm
for enhanced administrative and economic devolution in proximity to
the growth of class and industrial tension and the Scottish Council’s
clear desire to support the Heath government as it confronted various
economic, social and political difficulties. On the re-election of a
Labour government in 1974 the Scottish Council briefly revived and
even extended its devolutionary campaigning to political matters.
Further administrative and economic autonomy, through transferring
the Department of Energy and other industrial agencies to Scotland, was
to be strengthened by a Scottish ‘assembly with discretionary control of
taxation’. This would create ‘a secondary centre of industrial, political
and administrative power’ to ‘break the present London monopoly’.17
Such might be interpreted as an attempt – like Oceanspan – to place free
enterprise brakes on a Labour government with manifesto plans for
selected nationalisation of industry and redistribution of wealth from
capital to labour.18 Yet even these anti-Labour devolutionary impulses
were gradually diminishing as Scottish business leadership changed in
the 1970s, with foreign ownership gradually eclipsing ‘old-fashioned
tycoons’ like Lithgow and Clydesmuir, whose model of Tory reformism –
‘social capitalism’ was Lithgow’s phrase – was decreasingly present. Scot-
land’s business and Tory leaders duly adjusted – even in the rapid
deindustrialisation in the 1980s – to the decidedly anti-devolutionary
force of Thatcherism, which was itself unambiguously rooted in the class
and industrial conflicts of the 1970s.19
The discussion proceeds chronologically, in two parts. First, port
developments from roughly 1960 until and including the publication of
Oceanspan in 1969 are examined. These demonstrate that Scottish port
interests were dissatisfied with Whitehall’s conduct of policy in the early
1960s, before the Scottish Council’s later criticism of the Ministry of
Transport. Second, the inter-play of ports policy and wider industrial
and class tensions during the early 1970s are examined, illuminating the
extent to which Oceanspan was modified to represent a means of mitigat-
ing the growing economic and social difficulties associated with Scot-
land’s deindustrialisation, encapsulated in the rapid increase of
unemployment in the winter of 1971-2. These difficulties provided the
Oceanspan proposals with greater urgency but also diminished the likeli-
hood of their coming into being, for the Scottish Council’s industrial
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leaders – apparently anxious on party political and possibly social class
grounds to protect the Heath government – seemed to relax their cam-
paign for economic regeneration based on autonomous Scottish port
development.
*
Plans for port development in the early 1960s highlight dissatisfaction
among Scottish business leaders with Whitehall’s administration of invest-
ment through the Ministry of Transport and the Treasury. This was espe-
cially so at Leith, where the Dock Corporation’s planned expansion from
1959 onwards, to facilitate bulk grain imports, was resisted by Whitehall of-
ficials. The Dock Corporation argued that without investment to accom-
modate larger vessels the major trading concern in the port, Joseph Rank
Ltd, would downgrade or abandon its Leith operations, developing busi-
ness in Antwerp and Rotterdam instead. Bulk cargo would be landed in
these ports and trans-shipped in smaller vessels to Britain. But with a devel-
oped Leith trans-shipment would proceed from rather than to the Forth
and Scotland would capture a share of the growing trade with continental
Europe and Scandinavia.20 This latter point was linked to Britain’s mem-
bership of the European Free Trade Association. With support from other
grain traders and general shipping firms too, the Leith Dock Corporation
claimed national British significance for the plans. On this Scottish Office
officials agreed but were opposed by Sir James Dunnett, Permanent
Secretary at the Ministry of Transport, who enlisted support from Sir
John Winnifrith, his counterpart at the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Food. Winnifrith advised that Leith’s plans were not required to
maintain grain supplies on a UK basis and so Exchequer funding could
not be recommended.21
At this point, early in 1961, the Ministry of Transport curtailed
further discussion because Lord Rochdale had been appointed to
examine the efficiency of operations across ports throughout the UK.
Any single inquiry or development might compromise this larger inves-
tigation.22 The Conservative government’s motives in establishing
Rochdale’s inquiry were mixed and not transparent. It is likely that Min-
isters, including the Chancellor, Selwyn Lloyd, and the Prime Minister,
Harold Macmillan, were principally concerned about ‘restrictive’ labour
practices.23 But Ministry of Labour officials opposed this narrow focus,
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and Ministers were unwilling to confront unions and workers openly.24
Hence the inquiry was broadly devised but port employers and users
were still able to complain about labour practices and behaviour.25 On a
more positive note, although without urgency, Rochdale initiated the
longer-term restructuring that gradually realised investment in ports,
including on the Forth and Clyde estuaries.
Rochdale urged the establishment of a National Ports Authority to
advise on investment in capital projects; and, to secure the necessary
economies of scale and minimise ‘wasteful’ competition or duplication
of services, the estuarial or other regional grouping of port and harbour
authorities was recommended.26 A National Ports Council (NPC) –
rather than Authority – was duly established and the first estuarial group-
ing formed was the Clyde Port Authority (CPA) in 1966, a merger of four
bodies, the largest being Greenock and Glasgow Dock Corporations.27
This was a considerable accomplishment, given the competing interests
involved, especially between Greenock and Glasgow and, according to
Alistair G. McCrae, the CPA’s first chairman and a member of the NPC, it
enabled the establishment of the deep-water container terminal at
Greenock, opened for business by Labour’s Minister of Transport,
Richard Marsh, on 26 June 1969.28
The NPC was also involved in developing Leith, along lines envisaged
in 1959, with a major lock to establish permanent, deeper water eventu-
ally completed in 1969 at a cost of £7 million. The port was now adminis-
tered by a greater Forth Ports Authority (FPA), which emerged shortly
after the CPA. As one of the first NPC-approved schemes this was pre-
sented by the Department of the Environment (DOE), the Ministry of
Transport’s administrative successor in 1970, as a response to Scottish
criticism of Whitehall-controlled policy.29 Yet there was dissatisfaction
about the scale and very slow delivery of UK government support. The
Leith project, for instance, was roughly ten years in the making, from
initial campaign to final completion. These reservations in Scotland
about ports policy were advanced to a new level, however, by the
Labour government’s plans for nationalisation, which figured in the
party’s 1966 General Election manifesto, and were published in a
White Paper in January 1969. This – proposing nationalisation and
a UK-wide National Ports Authority to oversee subsequent investment
and development – aroused more open criticism of the Ministry
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of Transport and the Labour government by Scottish port users and
business leaders.30
Scottish criticism of Whitehall policy was, indeed, an explicit compo-
nent of Oceanspan, launched by the Scottish Council in June 1969. In
‘Turning Scotland Sideways’, as The Economist described the reconfigura-
tion of Scotland’s established north-south trade links, Oceanspan envis-
aged closer integration of the interests of Glasgow and Edinburgh.
Trade would be conducted primarily on a west-east axis. A Clyde ocean
terminal would ‘pump’ raw materials from the Atlantic to central belt
industry; finished goods would journey eastwards to the expanding con-
tinental European market through the Forth. This was not entirely
novel, noted The Economist, given the eighteenth century precedent of
the Forth and Clyde canal, but the possibilities opening with expanding
inter-European trade, enhanced by likely future UK membership of the
European Economic Community, certainly inflated the potential of
these trading links. Scotland, it was suggested, could represent a lucra-
tive ‘off-shore platform, strategically placed between the Atlantic Ocean
and Europe’.31
In Oceanspan these possibilities were interpreted as a counter to
de-industrialsation. The terminal points of the proposed ‘linear port
area’ would be Greenock and Hunterston in the west and Grangemouth
and Leith to the east; these could be linked by an inland gathering and
clearance depot at Gartsherrie in Lanarkshire. Hunterston, utilising one
of the Clyde’s deeper but relatively sheltered stretches, would be the site
of an iron ore terminal and related steel works. There were shades here
of the 1929 Brassert report, with its recommendation that Scottish steel
production be concentrated in a single combined import terminal and
works at Erskine on the Clyde.32 More immediate inspiration, however,
came from the Scottish and North-Western Group of the British Steel
Corporation, established to administer the industry nationalised by the
Labour government in 1967. In August 1968 the Scottish and
North-Western group had announced a proposal for an integrated ore
terminal and iron works at Hunterston.33 This, wrote Peter Payne, with
slight but nevertheless uncharacteristic oversight, given the leadership
role in Oceanspan of the Tory Lithgow, ‘was seized upon by Scottish
nationalists and by leading theoretical planners to become the centre-
piece of a new grand strategy for the industrial renewal of Central Scot-
land’.34
With the focus on iron and steel, and perhaps because of Lithgow’s
involvement, Christopher Harvie saw Oceanspan as turning away from
the Scottish Council’s earlier emphasis on new industries, encapsulated
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in the 1961 Toothill report,35 with its conclusion that industrial diversifi-
cation – achievable inter alia through improved investment, communica-
tions, transportation, regional development, housing and education –
was the means to more rapid economic growth.36 Yet there was much in
Oceanspan that actually reprised this earlier analysis; this was not surpris-
ing, given that Toothill remained a central figure in the Scottish Council
in 1969. There was, for instance, continued emphasis in Oceanspan on
the need to enhance central Scotland’s social and environmental infra-
structure, with the possibilities noted of housing a population of hun-
dreds of thousands in new towns in the ‘industrial corridor’ that would
be developed.37 This clearly echoed Toothill’s discussion of ‘Overspill’
and new towns.38 Furthermore, Oceanspan also affirmed the importance
of younger manufacturing enterprise as well as the heavy staples, envis-
aging enhanced European access as beneficial especially to those indus-
tries developed by US companies since 1945. These ranged
geographically from IBM in Greenock across central Scotland to NCR
and Timex in Dundee.39 Responsible for 12.3% of Scottish manufactur-
ing turnover in 1968, these companies exported 40% of their output;
further inward investment – and export activity – would be encouraged
through Oceanspan. Perhaps even the Hunterston proposal reinforced
Toothill’s call for diversification, for it was also to include an oil
terminal.
This grand design could not, however, be realised within existing
political and administrative frameworks, as the ‘linear port area’ could
only be achieved through an ‘effectively autonomous Scottish Ports
Authority’. Here was the point at which Oceanspan drew upon the explic-
itly anti-socialist elements of Scottish devolutionary sentiment in the
1960s, with the proposed Scottish Ports Authority to operate unhin-
dered by the Labour government’s projected nationalisation of port
transport under a National Ports Authority. Oceanspan’s Scottish Ports
Authority would be accountable to the Secretary of State for Scotland
rather than the Minister of Transport.40 It is worth re-emphasising here
that in Parliamentary debates Conservative MPs adopted an identical
position on these issues to the Scottish Council.41
Scottish businessmen had already been pressing for devolved admin-
istration of ports policy. In August 1969, through Alistair McCrae, chair-
man of Clyde Port Authority, Lithgow conveyed to the Scottish Office his
advocacy of a ‘Clyde/Forth axis’ and expressed concern that improve-
ments to the Clyde’s infrastructure would be delayed by the Labour gov-
ernment’s nationalisation plans. This would scupper the Clyde’s chance
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of a major contract with the Overseas Containers Ltd (OCL) shipping
company for a second container terminal at Greenock. Lithgow had
recently discussed this with Sir Andrew Crichton, chairman of OCL,
which operated routes to South America, Africa, Australasia, India and
the Far East.42 This pressure was maintained early in 1970, when McCrae
and John McWilliam, chairman of FPA, met Willie Ross, Labour’s Secre-
tary of State for Scotland, and complained that nationalisation would
divert investment to London and Liverpool and thwart Scottish initia-
tives such as the second Greenock container terminal. Scottish ventures
could only succeed if ‘London control’ were tempered by enhanced
Scottish Office involvement. James Mitchell has asserted that under Ross
the Scottish Office in the 1960s enjoyed an unprecedented degree of
‘autonomy from Westminster’,43 and the Clyde and Forth chairmen
perhaps felt Ross would support the isolation of Scottish port transport
from Whitehall’s nationalisation plans. But Ross also has a reputation as
a champion of non-devolved, UK-wide statism,44 and this shaped his
approach to ports policy. While admitting an initial attraction to ‘decen-
tralisation’, government colleagues had persuaded him that the ‘current
position’ was right on several grounds. First, the development of Scottish
ports was contingent on shipping from outside Scotland, and the Minis-
try of Transport could better judge this than the Scottish Office. Second,
if Scotland went its own way then England and Wales would develop
without reference to Scottish needs. Third, it was ‘naïve’ to ‘suppose’
that access to the Scottish Secretary alone would secure favourable treat-
ment for Scottish ports. Reasonably enough, perhaps, Ross observed
that the Treasury would retain control over expenditure and insist that
Scottish developments conform to UK national priorities. At this point
Ross drew attention to the government’s emphasis on regional policy,
framed in the 1966 Plan for Scotland, which – along lines similar to the
Toothill report – outlined various indicative improvements designed to
generate additional employment and faster economic growth. The Plan
highlighted the ‘natural advantages’ that Scotland offered to shipping,
with the narrowest distance anywhere in the UK between Atlantic and
North Sea ports, but restated the benefits to Scotland of Whitehall
administration of port development, citing as evidence the
NPC-approved investment schemes on the Forth and the Clyde.45 The
Whitehall approach, Ross insisted, was the ‘real hope’ for Scottish ports.
McCrae and McWilliam accepted that the Scottish Secretary would have
some influence in the ‘new machinery’ but were ‘apprehensive’ given
that ‘centralisation’ was the government’s aim and that ‘devolutionary
aspects were insecurely based and still to be proved’. There was, they
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added, too much riding on the personal determination, temperament
and inclination of the Secretary of State.46
Ross was, of course, involved in a running internal Labour argument
about the means of containing the growth of nationalist sentiment in
Scotland, encapsulated in the SNP’s victory at the Hamilton by-election
in 1967. Labour’s ‘response’ to nationalism was complicated and –
within the party – contested. Richard Crossman, Leader of the House of
Commons, saw possibilities in extending administrative devolution, and
established the Select Committee on Scottish Affairs in 1968.47 Much of
the Select Committee’s deliberations in 1968-9 were on the related ques-
tions of transport and economic development. The Ministry of Trans-
port, presenting evidence to the Committee, restated the defence of the
Whitehall ports policy, noting that the NPC’s first major investment
scheme had been at Leith. The Ministry also emphasised that ‘on all
aspects of Scottish port development and organisation’ it liaised closely
with the Scottish Office.48
Crossman’s approach was an attempt to mediate between Scottish
Labour’s opposing impulses on nationalism, which pitted the old guard,
led by Ross, against mainly younger figures, including John Pitcairn
Macintosh, a firm advocate of Home Rule. The Select Committee was
supplemented in 1969 by the Royal Commission on the Constitution, a
‘Wilsonian device’, according to Andrew Marr, that allowed the Prime
Minister, Harold Wilson, to remain neutral in this internal Labour con-
flict. The Royal Commission, chaired by Lord Crowther and then after
his death by Lord Kilbrandon, eventually reported in November 1973,
recommending a Scottish Senate, elected by proportional representa-
tion, and a Scottish Cabinet and Prime Minister, with a corresponding
reduction in the number of MPs at Westminster and the abolition of the
position of Secretary of State for Scotland.49
The processes of deindustrialisation and devolution intersected in the
work of the Royal Commission when it received evidence from the Scot-
tish Council in November 1969. This propounded a business case for
Home Rule, advocating an increase in the number of Scottish Office Min-
isters of State to bolster the Secretary of State and ‘exert an important
moderating influence’ on other departments and public bodies operat-
ing in Scotland. This suggestion was subsequently met with the reorgani-
sation of the Scottish Office’s economic powers in 1973.50 The Council’s
other main proposal was resisted: namely, that the Scottish Office could
be strengthened further, and devolution usefully advanced, by investing
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it with responsibility for a Scottish Ports Authority. This reprise of busi-
ness opposition to Labour’s nationalisation plans proposed that the Scot-
tish Ports Authority be accountable to the Secretary of State in the same
way as the South and North of Scotland Electricity Boards. The Scottish
Council linked these arrangements to the crucial nature of exports in
Scotland’s economy, particularly in the engineering and electronics
sectors that had been developed since 1945 with inward investment.
These firms – and the sectors they represented – were chiefly located in
the Clyde-Forth corridor that Oceanspan was designed to develop.51
The Scottish Council’s presentation of evidence to the Royal Commis-
sion in November 1969 coincided roughly with the publication of the
Ports Bill containing nationalisation measures originally spelt out in a
White Paper published in January 1969, and not especially contentious
in England and Wales. In 1966, shortly after Labour’s re-election, Keith
Joseph, Conservative spokesman on Transport, had complained that
nationalisation would inhibit enterprise and investment in the sector.52
But The Economist noted that the 1969 plans had scarcely raised ‘a few rip-
ples’, given that public authorities already owned all major ports, except
Manchester. A National Ports Authority would now link these authori-
ties, including those on the Forth and the Clyde. Controversy was also
muted because the Minister of Transport, Dick Marsh, had excluded
from the takeover all docks handling less than 5 million tons of cargo
per annum, omitting ‘vigorous enterprises’ such as Felixstowe and
Shoreham. This was a concession to business critics of plans framed by
Marsh’s predecessor, Barbara Castle, meaning that nationalisation was
really intended only for ports that, frankly, were declining.53 Set against
this relative absence of controversy in England, the opposition of the
Clyde and Forth port authorities and the position adopted in Parliament
by Scottish Conservative MPs was particularly significant, and certainly
when considered alongside the Scottish Council’s argument that
control of policy should be passed from the Ministry of Transport to the
Scottish Office. So there would have been relief in Scottish port and
business circles when the Ports Bill remained in the legislative queue at
the House of Lords on the dissolution of Parliament in June 1970.
Nationalisation was duly ruled out altogether by the Conservative Party’s
surprise victory in the subsequent election.
*
‘Three issues’, writes Andrew Marr, ‘in the early 1970s nudged the Scot-
tish debate along – oil, jobs and Europe’.54 Under-pinned by the twin
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processes of deindustrialisation and devolution, these issues were
central to a revised Oceanspan 2, published in October 1971 and used by
the Scottish Council to negotiate directly with the Conservative Prime
Minister, Edward Heath, on Scottish industrial and ports policy in the
difficult winter of 1971-2.55 Here the Scottish Council continued to press
for the transfer of ports policy to the Scottish Office, despite the passing
of the Labour government and its nationalisation proposals. The moti-
vation now was twofold: the longer running dissatisfaction with White-
hall administration of the ports; and the escalation of economic
difficulties and social, class and industrial tensions in 1971 and 1972.
Leading the campaign for Oceanspan 2 was Lord Clydesmuir, Chair-
man of the Scottish Council. Tony Benn, Minister of Technology in Wil-
son’s government, had in 1968 identified Clydesmuir as embodying
Britain’s lamentable business and industrial reliance on amateurish
‘Tory Hereditary Peers’.56 Clydesmuir’s business career at Colvilles, the
family firm where he was a director until steel nationalisation in 1967,
had, admittedly, been hampered by exogenous difficulties beyond his
control, chiefly the imposition by Macmillian’s government of the finan-
cially disastrous but politically expedient Ravenscraig strip mill in
1958.57 Yet it would be difficult to counter fully Benn’s implied criticism
that positions of influence in economic and public life were shaped as
much by political and dynastic place as personal qualification or compe-
tence. In this connection it seems significant that Peter Payne’s analysis
of Colvilles makes much of the career and qualities of John Colville, the
first Lord Clydesmuir, but says nothing at all about the son who inherited
the title in 1954.58 The second Clydesmuir certainly had connections,
combining his Scottish Council chairmanship with the Deputy Gover-
norship and then the Governorship of the Bank of Scotland; until the
end of 1971 he was also Governor of the British Linen Bank, where Sir
William McEwen Younger, industrial brewer and chairman of the Scot-
tish Conservative Party, was also a Director.59
Clydesmuir’s political and personal connections at least ensured,
however, that Oceanspan 2 received a Prime Ministerial hearing. The key
difference from the earlier design – consistent with Marr’s characterisa-
tion of the ‘Scottish debate’ in this period – was the greater emphasis on
oil, to generate demand for indigenous Scottish manufacturing and as a
revenue source for capital investment. An amplification of the European
context was evident too. Speaking about EEC membership at a confer-
ence organised by the Scottish Committee of the United Europe Associ-
ation in January 1970, Toothill had said that, ‘unless we get in we have
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had our chips’.60 So the revised plans were in tune with both North Sea
developments and the new government’s drive to Common Market
entry. But the established concerns with employment and industrial
regeneration were even more important in the early 1970s than they had
been in the late 1960s. In September 1970 a delegation from the Scottish
Trades Union Congress met John Davies, Heath’s new Minister of Tech-
nology and shortly to become Secretary of State for Trade and Indus-
try.61 The Trades Unionists lobbied for policies to reverse rising unem-
ployment in Scotland following job losses in the West of Scotland at
Singers, Burroughs, UCS and at Leyland in West Lothian. Although
Clydesmuir optimistically observed that Scotland’s ‘share’ of UK unem-
ployment had fallen to 16% at this point from 24% – of a much smaller
aggregate – in 1954,62 the employment position progressively deterio-
rated. By the winter of 1971-2, partly because of Heath’s continuing
determination to loosen support for declining industry in pursuit of
rapid economic restructuring, unemployment in the UK and especially
central Scotland was escalating rapidly.63
The growing economic and social difficulties in Scotland were encap-
sulated, arguably, with the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders entering receiver-
ship in June 1971 and stimulating the famous ‘work-in’ of roughly 8,000
workers that commenced on 30 July.64 This ended only when Heath’s
government, fearing civil disorder in the event of closure, announced
late in February 1972 the provision of subsidies to keep three of the four
UCS yards open. Cabinet Ministers noted with regret that state support
‘on this scale would not be likely to commend itself to the Government’s
supporters’,65 and this was indeed Heath’s first economic and industrial
about-turn.66 Others followed, as industrial, economic and social pres-
sures mounted. On 20 January 1972 UK unemployment exceeded one
million for the first time since 1947;67 this coincided with the successful
6-week strike in January and February by the National Union of Mine-
workers (NUM), which was supported by workers in numerous
industries.
In Scotland – as elsewhere – the miners’ strike was characterised by
serious social tension. At Longannet power station on 14 February 1972 a
picket of some 2,000 miners, comprising men from Fife, Clackmannan,
Stirlingshire, Lanarkshire and Ayrshire, clashed with around 400 police
officers (three of whom were treated in hospital for injuries sustained in
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the exchange); thirteen men – eleven miners plus an unemployed
draughtsman and a chemistry research student – were charged with
‘mobbing and rioting’ and taken into custody.68 Ewen Cameron has sug-
gested that this charge was extremely serious, of a qualitatively higher
degree than the standard charge in cases of social unrest of breaching
public order.69 Hence, perhaps, the pronounced anger of the day’s other
casualty, Mick McGahey, President of the Scottish Area of the NUM,
whose leg was encased in plaster after an ‘accidental’ – his word – kick
from a policeman. McGahey described the charges against the thirteen as
‘scurrilous’ but unsurprising given, as he saw it, ‘that there is no such
thing as neutrality in society and the law is not neutral’. The clear infer-
ence that the law contained significant anti-labour and anti-working class
biases was resented by the Lord Advocate, Norman Wylie, who warned
McGahey and the NUM that the robust picketing – six men were charged
with breaching the peace and two of these also with ‘assault on the police’
at Longannet on 17 February – together with their public pronounce-
ments on the charges against those arrested, constituted an unacceptable
degree of interference in the operation of the law.70
These uproarious events at Longannet recalled the rumbustious char-
acter of miners’ protests from an earlier era, where in workplace dis-
putes whole communities exerted physical pressure on employers or
judicial authorities. Largely making way for more ‘ordered’ and bureau-
cratic protests from the 1910s onwards,71 these earlier quasi-rebellions
were themselves an echo of the ‘moral economy’ riots of pre- and ear-
lier-industrial Scotland.72 But the authorities in 1972 were more worried
by the resemblance between Longannet and pickets at other energy
establishments in the UK, with the famous blockade of Saltley coke
depot in Birmingham coming to a head days earlier on 10 February.73
Nevertheless, given the scale of the protest, and to dampen the atmo-
sphere of crisis, the government – through Wylie – engaged, according
to the Glasgow Herald, in ‘intensive activity’ to secure the early release of
the men on bail at £20 per man at a private hearing at Dunfermline
Sheriff Court. Home Office officials noted with relief that despite the
presence outside of roughly 1,000 supporters, ‘there were no inci-
dents’.74 Nevertheless, the Dunfermline crowd was revealingly described
by the Glasgow Herald’s Court of Session Correspondent, George Watt, as
a disturbing feature of the episode, deepening the impression that the
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authorities had relaxed normal legal measures to avert unexpected and
potentially uncontrollable social tension.75 The ‘Longannet thirteen’
were subsequently found not guilty by a jury at Dunfermline in June
1972,76 and the miners’ victorious strike was followed by a ‘Glorious
Summer’ of industrial unrest encompassing several economic sectors,
although Scotland was not so directly affected by these events as it had
been by the miners’ strike. The outcome was another significant defeat
for Heath, with the demise of the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, a core
element of his original ‘modernisation’ strategy.77
So Oceanspan 2 was launched during a substantial economic, social
and political crisis; perhaps this induced the editor of the Scotsman to
welcome this ‘Vision splendid’ and to envisage that the scheme would be
‘painlessly financed’ from oil revenues.’ In framing its package in the
conjunction of oil revenues and EEC membership, the Scottish Council
recommended a development fund for the expansion of roads and
ports, likening the possibilities to those suggested in the Toothill
Report, when Macmillan had been pressed, eventually, to an interven-
tionist regional policy shaped by various industrial incentives in 1963.
Lord Clydesmuir, The Scotsman suggested, was articulating a ‘Scottish
consensus’, based on economic devolution but ignored by both Labour
and Tory parties in London, with the Scottish Council now restored to
relevance after the alleged stagnation of the mid- to late-1960s – the
period, in other words, between Toothill and the first Oceanspan.78
Oceanspan 2’s oil-based development fund is worth emphasising,
given the subsequent history of the North Sea’s ‘wasted windfall’. Chris-
topher Harvie has dwelt on the missed opportunities of the 1970s and
1980s, with successive Labour and Conservative governments dissipat-
ing oil revenues on tax cuts for the fortunate and welfare support for the
unfortunate.79 Meanwhile, both oil and indeed Scotland are topics virtu-
ally absent from John Campbell’s standard biography of Edward
Heath.80 This may, of course, accurately reflect the Prime Minister’s
broad priorities, although in January 1972 Heath did give favourable
consideration to a development fund, separate from regular Exchequer
revenue and expenditure. Political expediency was involved; at a lunch
in January 1972 with Younger, Davies and Gordon Campbell, the Secre-
tary of State for Scotland, Heath argued that oil revenues might, with
‘advantage’, to the Conservative Party perhaps as well as Scotland, be
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‘labelled as Scottish, and used for Scottish development, instead of
English money’.81
Heath’s lunch preceded a meeting with Scottish Council representa-
tives, led by Clydesmuir, to discuss Oceanspan 2, which divided the Prime
Minister’s guests. Younger had devised the Conservative Party’s
response to Scottish Nationalism by drafting limited devolution propos-
als. These were quietly shelved following the 1970 General Election,
principally because the nationalists’ forward march appeared to have
halted, but the distaste for devolution among Conservative Party activists
was also significant.82 Younger was, nevertheless, enthusiastic about
Oceanspan 2, writing a paper in December 1971, ‘Regional Policy: Scot-
land’, read by Heath, Davies and Gordon Campbell in advance of this
lunch. The paper examined the political disadvantages to the Conserva-
tive Party of rising unemployment and falling business confidence in
western Scotland, and the need for dramatic public investment to engi-
neer rapid industrial restructuring. Younger was especially concerned –
hence the oil-based development fund – about the ‘disastrous’ implica-
tions of viewing North Sea Oil as ‘a purely extractive industry’. So
Younger saw Oceanspan 2 as bolstering the Tories in west Scotland. It
would also transform Regional Policy, going beyond the ‘modest’
achievement of inward investment in electronics and subsidising
‘non-viable’ undertakings or the unsustainably imbalanced industrial
structure.83
Younger – and the Scottish Council – enjoyed private support at the
Scottish Office from Campbell, thought by Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) officials to favour government support for Oceanspan 2.
The DTI opposed the plans as insufficiently costed: they covered indus-
trial plants, installations for oil, aluminia, petrochemicals and steel; but
they contained no estimates for port and other transport developments,
acquisition of land, housing or other linked aspects on the Forth. These
would be significant and ultimately the government’s responsibility, so
no ‘firm commitment’ could be given to the Scottish Council.84 Hence
no decisive government view emerged from Heath’s lunch. The Prime
Minister seemed more interested in Scotland’s general political and
economic condition, as he understood it. An official noted:
the Prime Minister expressed general pessimism about the political and
economic good sense of the Scots. Sir William said that he should not be
misled by the neurotic state of a few businessmen in the West of Scotland.
It was true that there was a dearth of enterprising business talent in Scot-
land, but he was not too gloomy about the chance of the political holding
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operation which as Chairman of the Party in Scotland he was now con-
ducting.85
Younger conceded that this would require a ‘bold step’, which Heath
ruled out, recalling that a ‘dramatic move of this kind’ had been made
by Macmillan ‘when the Colvilles steel mill had been sent to Scotland’.
This had been a mistake, ‘unrewarding from every point of view. It was
important to work with the grain and not against it’. Heath then added
his observation about the potential of the proposed oil-based
development fund, before Oceanspan 2 was examined. This Davies
diplomatically praised in principle but damned in practice as requiring
‘a great deal of public investment long before any return in terms of
jobs’.86
The meeting with the Scottish Council took place the following day,
13 January 1972, with the Glasgow Herald talking up the restraint, moder-
ation and good sense of these Scottish business leaders. ‘Unlike some vis-
itors to Whitehall’, the paper noted, ‘the Scottish Council do not resort
to demands for such meetings at every deterioration in a situation which
the Government may or may not be in a position to influence’. Despite
the disproportionate concentration of unemployment in Scotland,
Clydesmuir and his colleagues – Sir John Toothill and Lord Polwarth,
Governor of the Bank of Scotland – were not going to ‘moan about
unemployment’ but explore the possibilities of the Hunterston steel
plant and a European strategy embracing petrochemicals, oil and
steel.87 A leader in The Times, perhaps surprisingly, was also upbeat about
Oceanspan 2 and government subsidy,88 and the meeting was apparently
conducted in a positive atmosphere. Clydesmuir summarised Oceanspan
2; Heath praised the Scottish Council’s ambitions and the emphasis on
the EEC context. Clydesmuir then asked that government take full ‘cog-
nisance’ of Oceanspan 2 when shaping ports policy, which should be
transferred to the Scottish Office. Gordon Campbell said the Scottish
Office was examining the report; Davies noted that the ore terminal at
Hunterston would be established before too long,89 and that the British
Steel Corporation (BSC) was still considering both the question and pos-
sible location of a new works. At the beginning of February BSC duly
agreed to open talks with the Clyde Port Authority about establishing a
terminal at Hunterston capable of handling ships up to 250,000 tons ini-
tially, with a possible extension later to accommodate vessels of 350,000
tons. This was further encouragement for the Scottish Council and the
Secretary of State, who – prematurely, as it happened – described the
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Hunterston proposal as a ‘first class investment in the future of Scot-
land’.90
Heath wrote to Clydesmuir on 17 January, praising the Scottish Coun-
cil’s ‘constructive and forward-looking approach’ to Scottish economic
problems. The Prime Minister appreciated the European context of the
discussions, stating that, ‘your determination to take full advantage of
our entry into the EEC gave me much encouragement’. The immediate
industrial and social pressures were eased by the government’s
announcement of the ‘rescue’ of UCS on 28 February. This coincided
exactly with the resumption of work that day by the miners after their
successful strike;91 it was followed by the expansionist Budget of 21
March and the Industry Bill, unveiled on 22 March to assist industry
through general tax allowances and provisions for specific companies.92
The Scottish Council approved these initiatives, which formed the basis
of a further meeting – again involving Heath, Davies and Gordon Camp-
bell on the Ministerial side – that took place in Edinburgh on 12 May
1972.93 There was little disagreement now, with the shared approach
encapsulated, perhaps, by the presence at this meeting of Polwarth in his
new capacity as Minister of State for Scotland.94
But cordial relations did not imply compliance on the part of the gov-
ernment. The Prime Minister resisted both of the Scottish Council’s two
long-standing requests: the Scottish Office would not assume responsi-
bility for the ports; there would be no substantial public investment in
Oceanspan. Heath communicated this non-negotiable position to
Clydesmuir in November 1972, stating that the ‘balance of advantage
lies in treating ports in the United Kingdom as a whole’,95 with policy in
all parts of the UK to remain the province of the DOE. To answer the
long-running criticism that Whitehall administration of ports policy was
too remote from Scotland, the DOE established a separate branch of its
Ports Directorate in St. Andrew’s House to work with Scottish port
authorities, the Scottish Office and the National Ports Council to ‘ad-
vance’ the position of Scottish ports, as Heath put it to Clydesmuir. This
was at the suggestion of Scottish Office officials, who continued to insist
that the future prosperity of west central Scotland especially was contin-
gent on significant port investment and development.96
*
Heath’s establishment of the DOE Edinburgh outpost was, in effect, the
end of Oceanspan. This was, it should be emphasised, an imaginative
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response to deindustrialisation, but the planned regeneration of older
industries and expansion of the new were constrained by Scotland’s
physical situation and geographical characteristics. Oceanspan was based
on the premise that these features were in Scotland’s favour. Deep water
on the Clyde, combined with Scotland’s position between the Atlantic
Ocean and Continental Europe, would enable large, ocean-going vessels
to drop goods on the Clyde for onward shipment to other points in
Europe. There was strong support for this optimistic view in Scotland’s
daily press,97 and inter-continental endeavour had, of course, character-
ised Scottish trading activity during earlier periods of economic develop-
ment, notably with the colonial-driven growth of the eighteenth
century.98 Yet the English south coast was closer to large segments of
both the UK and European markets; the deep North Sea water near Rot-
terdam was in any case preferable to the Clyde for ocean-going vessels
carrying goods to Continental destinations. The pioneer of
containerised transportation, the American firm Sea Land, duly main-
tained its established practice of calling first at Rotterdam’s Europort,
and then trans-shipping to British and other European destinations.99
Other big container firms followed suit, rather than vice versa, as
Lithgow and his colleagues had hoped.100 The impact of this geography
on Oceanspan, constraining its potential, recalls the long-term structural
environmental factors that Fernand Braudel wrote about in his cele-
brated history of the Mediterranean. The imperceptibly changing fea-
tures of land, mountain, river, valley and sea, Braudel emphasised, are
the decisive causal factors in shaping historical change, and Lithgow and
the Scottish Council could not transcend these profound physical char-
acteristics.101
As a campaigning organisation, it should be noted, the Scottish
Council was inhibited from the second half of 1972 not just by the politi-
cal need to support Heath’s government. It was hampered by a severe
shortage of cash, chiefly the consequence of mergers and closures affect-
ing its private sector subscribers. This itself was further evidence of the
economic insecurities that tied the organisation more closely to govern-
ment.102 In any event Heath’s likely appetite for ‘Scottish’ ventures was
waning. Just as support for political devolution was abated by the appar-
ent containment of the SNP, at least as indicated by the result of the 1970
General Election, so economic or industrial measures that were
designed to respond to the specific threat of Scottish nationalism,
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sentiments and circumstances also appeared superfluous. The early
1970s, in Scotland as elsewhere in the UK, were characterised by an
upsurge in industrial unrest and, arguably, class conflict, generated in
substantial measure by Heath’s attempt to ‘reform’ industrial relations
while withdrawing public subsidies for ‘uneconomic’ industrial enter-
prises. There was, of course, a Scottish dimension to this economic,
social and political crisis, manifested most visibly in the UCS work-in.
This particular difficulty framed Heath’s contacts with the Scottish
Council in 1971-2, and was at the root, no doubt, of the Scottish business
anxieties that Sir William McEwan Younger attributed to the ‘neurotic
state’ of some industrialists in Western Scotland. Yet Heath’s economic
and industrial difficulties were encountered on much broader sectoral
and geographical fronts. The 1971 Industrial Relations Act, overturning
‘voluntarist’ traditions with state regulation of trade unions to minimise
the economic impact of industrial unrest, and related attempts to
control pay inflation with incomes policies, met huge resistance from
organised labour. Both policies were undermined – fatally, in the case of
the Industrial Relations Act – by events in the ‘Glorious Summer’ of
1972, when major industrial disputes in port transport and construction
followed the earlier and successful national strike in coalmining. As the
work of the government unravelled, amid mass picketing and the politi-
cally damaging and socially divisive imprisonment of workers who were
defying the law, Heath and his colleagues were understandably more
worried about angry London dockers than neurotic Glasgow business-
men.103
What followed was the end – according to Andrew Marr – of the
Toothill or ‘McButskellite’ era: further industrial relations and eco-
nomic crises across the UK in 1973 and 1974, related to the global oil
shock arising from the Israeli-Arab conflict, and subsequent energy
shortages and the crumbling authority of Heath’s government. The
Tories duly abandoned the post-war ‘consensus’; Heath was jettisoned
and what became known as Thatcherism emerged in the second half of
the decade. Firmer emphasis was placed on the politics and society of
consumption rather than the politics and society of production; eco-
nomic ‘restructuring’ was geared to maximising profits – and to an
extent the short-term or immediate material benefits to middle class
consumers.104 This approach was not obviously more sustainable in the
long run than the Toothill or Butskellite approach – hence the social
and political anxieties in 2003-4 about the ‘relocation’ of call centre and
other forms of service sector employment from Scotland to India or
other labour cost-saving countries.105 It is certainly not the future that
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104 Marr, Battle for Scotland, 114.
105 ‘Call centre industry at crossroads, says report’ [by Phil Taylor of Stirling University
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Oceanspan envisaged for Scotland, with sustainable growth and general
social well-being thought to be contingent on the continuing primacy of
industrial production.106
At Hunterston there was to be no grand design. Plans for an ore termi-
nal that could accommodate ships of up to 250,000 or even 350,000 tons,
with adjoining iron and steel works, were revised downwards, so that an
ore and coal terminal for vessels of up to 35,000 tons only was built
between 1973 and 1978; proposals for the iron and steel works were
developed and work begun but not completed.107 Yet by the end of the
1970s, and despite the outcome of the 1979 referendum, the dynamics
of class and nation were changing again in significant ways. The growth
of Thatcherism, rooted in the class and industrial divisions of the early
1970s; the subsequent engineering of ‘instant post-industrialisation’ and
economic hardship in Scotland’s central belt; government attacks on
the integrity and rights of organised labour; cumulatively these dynam-
ics produced further – and ultimately irresistible – pressure for the devo-
lution to Scotland of administrative and political power.
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